

LEVICOVINY.

Journal of Levice party

Solidarity price: 3 Euro

SPECIAL VOLKSSTIMMEFEST EDITION



Dear readers,

it is my pleasure to introduce you to the first English issue of our party journal Levicoviny (Leftnews). Because Czech politics are rarely in the spotlight of the world media, we are trying to present to you in this issue as much information about the situation in our country as possible. First article is analysis of the second round of czech presidential elections, second article focuses on defeat of czech left wing parties in last parliamentary elections, third is a brief summary of rich history of our party and fourth and final is about rise of far right. We hope that you have a pleasant reading!

Editor-in-chief,
Vítek Prokop

CONTENT:

1. 2023's Czech presidential election is a Post-Soviet farce...page 2
2. Czech Left in Crisis ...page 6
3. LEVICE 2023: Thirty years of work in the Czech party system...page 8
4. Rise of the far right in Czechia...page 13

2023's Czech presidential election is a Post-Soviet farce

Vítek Prokop



Members of the Politburo once asked Stalin which communist deviation was worse, the right-wing one represented by Bukharin or the left-wing one led by Trotsky. Stalin immediately replied: “both are worse – each in their own way.” Surprisingly, this classic Soviet joke also applies to our choices in the current Czech presidential election. Which of the two finalists is worse? Both. Each in their own way.

On January 14th, former prime minister and billionaire Andrej Babiš and former NATO military chairman Petr Pavel advanced to the second round. In the foreign press, the role of the Czech president is often described as purely ceremonial. Of course, Czechia has a parliamentary regime, and presidential powers are primarily representative, but historically the president has always enjoyed a great deal of informal influence. This includes the ability to raise policy issues and shape the nature of political debate in Czechia.

Contender 1: Petr Pavel – the General

The first round of the election was narrowly won by Petr Pavel, who garnered 35.40% of the vote. His campaign was backed by a long list of Czech capitalists. He was financially supported by Martin Hájek, the 21st richest Czech according to Forbes magazine, Dalibor Dědek, the 59th richest, and Ondřej Fryc, the 91st. Their generous donations to Pavel's campaign had a hidden purpose. It doesn't hurt to have a man in the Czech presidential palace who owes you a favor.

Pavel, known among his supporters simply as “the General,” built his campaign on the slogan “Let’s Return Order and Peace to the Czech Republic.” One cannot but describe this slogan as fascist – which is perhaps why so many capitalists support it. But what is Pavel’s idea of order anyway? It is hard to say, since the General’s ideological development has shifted throughout his life. Although his campaign marketing experts try to portray him as a champion of the mythical Western values of which the Czech bourgeoisie speaks so fondly, this was not always the case. In 1983 Pavel joined the Communist Party. Just before the fall of the proto-socialist regime he was trained as a military intelligence agent. His political testimony survives in archives, where his thorough knowledge of Marxism-Leninism is documented.

For years, the Czech bourgeoisie portrayed members of the Communist Party as being morally decrepit at best and criminal at worst. Now “their” candidate is a former career Communist – something Pavel shares with his opponent. Andrej Babiš was also a Communist Party member and, according to archival material, actively cooperated with the secret police (he vehemently denies any cooperation himself).

This will be the first time in the existence of the independent Czech Republic that the president will not be a militant who actively participated in the Velvet Revolution, which ended the proto-socialist regime in Czechoslovakia in 1989. The career Communist background of both candidates shows the utter impotence, ideological emptiness, and lack of coherent vision for the future offered by the current liberal capitalist system, which has been unable to nurture a new generation of political leaders for 30 years.

Contender 2; Andrej Babis – the “Czech Donald Trump”

Andrej Babiš won 34.99% of the vote in the first round of elections this year. Originally from Slovakia, he is the fifth richest Czech according to Forbes. Apart from the media, his business empire also includes the agricultural conglomerate Agrofert, whose subsidiaries include the Vodňanské kuře poultry farm, notorious for employing agency workers from Bulgaria and Vietnam. These workers often reside in the Czech Republic illegally and are forced to work 12- to 14-hour shifts in freezing temperatures with noise levels that exceed standards set by the Labour Code.

Babiš has described himself as the Czech Donald Trump. Like Trump, his political career has been marred by a series of scandals. Just before the first round of the presidential election, a court found him not guilty in the Čapí hnízdo farm case, where there was reasonable suspicion of misuse of EU funds. Babiš is currently under investigation in France on suspicion of money laundering and tax evasion based on findings from the Pandora Papers. However, the ongoing investigation did not prevent French President Macron from receiving Babiš on a visit just before the elections. Before that, Babiš managed to have breakfast with Bernard Arnault – currently the richest man on the planet. One can only wonder what the two billionaires discussed over coffee and croissants.

After chaotically failing to contain the pandemic (another parallel to Donald Trump) in 2021, Babiš narrowly lost the parliamentary elections when two opposition coalitions formed against him: the Spolu (Together) coalition uniting three right-wing parties and the centrist Pirates and Mayors coalition.

The current government, composed of both coalitions, is a classic neoliberal government – it is planning to charge for certain health care premiums, at a time when it is difficult to provide any standard health care at all in some peripheral zones of Czechia. It is also considering raising value added tax on selected products such as medicines, which are now in short supply in the Czech Republic. It is not too surprising that of all European leaders, the Czech Prime Minister enjoys the least trust in his country.

How did we get here?

Before the presidential elections began, the ruling trio in the Spolu coalition expressed support for three different presidential candidates, one of whom was Petr Pavel. This is now Babiš's strongest weapon in the campaign. He describes Pavel as a pro-government candidate and warns that if he were to become president, the right-wing would control all centers of power since it already has a comfortable majority in both houses of parliament. By admitting that he voted for the Spolu coalition and using right-wing arguments in his attacks against Babiš, Pavel essentially gives his opponent the benefit of the doubt.

Babiš defines himself against the right and effectively styles himself as the protector of the poor – after all, it was his government that increased pensions and salaries of state employees. Now however, due to rampant inflation, wages are falling in real terms. Given that no left-wing party has been represented in the Czech parliament since the last elections, Babiš's posturing as a friend of the people is working well in the media. According to polls, his voters associate him with sensitivity to social conditions, despite the notoriously appalling treatment of rank-and-file employees in Babiš's companies. Given the unpopularity of the current government, Babiš is probably counting on the fact that his ANO movement, which he founded in 2011 as a center-right formation, could win the next parliamentary elections. If Babiš were to become president, he would probably put a non-confrontational technocrat at the head of his ANO party who would have no problem forming a government. With the presidency and government under his direct control and his vast business empire under his hand, his position of power would be unshakeable.

What we can expect

There is no need for a complex analysis to understand what the Czech presidential election really represents. It is a struggle between two feuding groups within the Czech oligarchy. On the one hand there is the business tycoon Babiš, who calculated that it would be cheaper to enter politics directly instead of influencing it from behind the scenes. On the other, there is a cohort of smaller oligarchs who fear that Babiš might gain a hegemonic position, and influence Czech politics from the shadows in a more traditional way.

Realizing that much is at stake, both are campaigning in an incredibly brutal way. The hidden problems of the Czech Republic are coming to light in these elections – disregard for poor periphery regions and latent racism are on full view.

After the first round of the election, Czech Twitter, which is mostly used by the middle class, was flooded with insults against people living on the periphery who mostly voted for Babiš. The Dekomunizace (Decommunization) Association displayed a banner with a photo of Communist president Gustáv Husák – the only Slovak president in the history of Czechoslovakia – hanging behind a half-naked Babiš with a caption above both: “No more Czecho-Slovaks!” The internet is full of similar racist attacks on Babiš’s origins.

Pavel describes the election as a battle between two worlds – his, who holds the upright pro-Western views, and Babiš’s, who is dishonest and pro-Russian. Pavel is thus deliberately helping to polarize society – a polarization which even led to someone sending a bullet to Babiš’s wife in the mail. Babiš, of course, is not lagging behind in this regard. Indeed, immediately after the results were tallied he compared Pavel to Putin, saying that, like the Russian president, he was a Communist spy.

This atmosphere of heated hatred is completely unnecessary. The Czech Republic will continue to be an oligarchy. As The New York Times described with the detached insight of an outside observer, *“No matter which of the top two candidates [...] eventually triumphs, the departure of Mr. Zeman, the Czech president for the past decade, should put the country’s foreign relations back on an unambiguously pro-Western path.”*

Conclusion

Although it is difficult to maintain an impartial position during a period of highly visible nationwide campaigning, the Czech Left should not forget that it does not have a horse in this race. We now have a great opportunity to observe the situation calmly and to analyze machinations of manipulative oligarchs in Czech society. At the same time, this election is also a warning to us. Unless we redouble our efforts and succeed in bringing the left back into Czech parliamentary politics, the next elections will be yet another clash between different shades of the right.

Translated and edited by Florent Marchais, freelance journalist and activist based in Paris, France. First published online in The Left Berlin.



President Pavel meeting with Japanese prime minister during NATO summit in Lithuania

Czech Left in Crisis

Jan Májíček



The parliamentary elections in 2021 marked a major turning point. For the first time, neither of the two established political parties made it into the Chamber of Deputies. The plethora of new subjects, together with a highly polarised campaign and the fact that both the Social Democrats and the Communists supported the governments of billionaire Andrej Babiš, took their toll. A new period has begun for these two parties in which they are attempting to make their return to the highest levels of politics.

But by the time the October 2021 elections came around, left-wing politics was long in crisis. The Social Democrats, with the billionaire Babiš, ruled directly; the Communists supported this government. Although there were small improvements, such as the indexation of pensions or the increase in the minimum wage, this unholy alliance meant the complete disintegration of what the two left parties represented.

The Social Democrats had always been a pro-system socially sensitive party, defending the Labour Code or opposing the introduction of university tuition fees. The Communists have been seen as a systemic opposition that, while not having great ambitions, reflects the interests of the least successful in today's system.

It was the association with the multi-billionaire and his ANO project that meant that both parties were exposed to pressure from the conservative right, which had an extra argument for why a government of the left was a disaster, but also from the far right, which had long sought to position itself as the only systemic opposition. It succeeded in doing so and profited considerably in the elections.

The crisis of the two left parties has led to the emergence of two new subjects, the Left Party and the Future Movement, at the turn of 2019 and 2020. The former was inspired by Germany's Die Linke, the latter by Spain's Podemos. However, the COVID-19 pandemic and the subsequent lockdowns halted the promising momentum of both new entities, and they remained isolated. In the meantime, the two, multiply larger parties began to make a comeback and mobilize their members and supporters. Unlike the new parties, their absence from parliament is a life-threatening situation. For decades, these parties were used to media attention and state funding. This makes their appeal all the more urgent, and the position of the new parties all the more complicated, as the latter can only offer interesting ideas, but the prospect of their implementation is far from certain.

Czech trade unions are not in a good position either. After the unsuccessful candidacy of Josef Středula, the president of the largest trade union confederation, the unions are weakened, they lack the confidence to organize major actions and have not found a way to gain and keep more allies.

Despite this very complicated terrain, glimmers of hope appear here and there in the form of smaller workers' protests or strikes, or efforts to stand together in European, regional or parliamentary elections in the near future. Whether something new and viable will emerge from these unity-seeking initiatives is too early to judge. Nevertheless, the Czech left is continuing its struggle for a different world.



Flag of czech trade union organisation Czech-Moravian Confederation of Trade Unions

LEVICE 2023: Thirty years of work in the Czech party system

Jiří Hudeček



Our party is celebrating its 30th anniversary this year: our legal predecessor, the party Levý blok (Left Bloc), was registered in August 1993. It represents for us an incentive to look back and assess our activities. In the international context, it can also provide an opportunity to tell more about developments in Czech left-leaning politics in the last decades. In fact, it used to be quite exceptional in Central and Eastern Europe between 1990 and 2020, and I was asked to explain it quite often. Because our party originated as a split-off of the Communist Party (CPBM), we cannot avoid starting with some description of key moments and features of the history of the communist movement in our country.

Deep-rooted leftist tradition in the Czech society

To understand the situation today, we have to stop briefly in the more remote past to become more familiar with the situation in our country. (I will focus primarily on its Czech part, the developments in Slovakia were somewhat different.)

There was a quite strong position of the Social Democrats and later of the Communist Party in the Czechoslovak political life. Before WWII, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ) counted among the strongest member parties of the Comintern outside the USSR. In the pre-war years, the KSČ always got over 10 % of the vote in parliamentary elections, competing with the Social Democrats and the third left-leaning party (Socialists).

This tendency became even stronger after the war when these three parties started to cooperate in the "socialist bloc" and, together with the Christian democratic party (ČSL), monopolized for themselves the political life in the so-called "National Front". The cooperation quickly changed into a struggle, which ended with KSČ decisive victory in 1948 and finally in the regime of "peoples democracy", similar to other countries in the Soviet-dominated East Europe (with Soviet "advisors" in crucial security services). The National Front was converted to a merely ceremonial entity, and the non-communist parties were subjugated to the KSČ in all aspects (social democrats were forced to merge with KSČ). All illusions about the "Czechoslovak way to socialism" ended. Alas, there was one crucial difference in comparison to most countries of the Soviet bloc: the Communist party retained its mass character (in some moments having over 2,5 million members; not all of them just formal or lured by career opportunities), and after the death of Stalin and Gottwald in March 1953 and the following "thawing" the prestige of the in the society KSČ was comparably high. There was even some "golden era" in the 1960s in literature, movie production, science, etc.

Prague Spring and the forced "normalization" as constant trauma for the Czech left

One of the features of Czech political life in the late 1960s was the surviving legacy of the Stalinist repressions, connected to A. Novotný (President of State and the 1st Secretary of the Party till January 1968) and his generation. In a sense, the de-Stalinization was not finished. Other problems cumulated in the economic sphere, and in 1967 the tensions also grew with Slovak political elites (due to the inept policy of Novotny). These were among the reasons why the well-known Prague Spring started with a "revolutionary" plenary session of the Central Committee of KSČ in December 1967/January 1968. There is not enough space here to supplement the plethora of literature about this period in any substantial way. I would like to stress only two key aspects: (i) it was primarily the Communist party itself and its members, who started the democratization process, and (ii) till the forcible interruption in August 1968, the developments were more or less under the control of KSČ and its leadership, who enjoyed immense popular support. Nowadays, these features are rarely mentioned in Czech media, which concentrate on the August invasion of the Warsaw Pact armies and the later suppression of Czech political life and freedoms (including the purge inside the KSČ, forcing over 300 000 members out of the party). Nonetheless, the ethos of "socialism with human face" still lived in the Czechoslovak society in the 1980s.

Gorbachev and the Velvet Revolution

Changes in the USSR after 1985, initiated by M.S. Gorbachev, were very closely monitored in Czechoslovakia - not only in the general populace but also in the leadership of KSČ.

Nevertheless, little changed, and the official rejection of the ideas of Prague Spring persisted in party politics, even after its 20th anniversary in 1988.

There was growing dissatisfaction with this attitude, including in some circles inside the KSČ. These feelings gained momentum after changes in other Soviet satellite states when it became obvious, that the USSR under Gorbachev would not use force and would allow a free political development.

We will probably never know to what extent the famous "Velvet Revolution" in November 1989 was staged inside the security apparatus and the younger echelon of party elites (as some conspiracy theorists maintain) and to what extent it was a spontaneous eruption of people's dissatisfaction or a result of the courageous struggle of the dissidents with Havel at the helm. One fact is sure - the tide was much faster than anybody expected. If there was some secret plot behind the quite mysterious police attack on students on the evening of November 17, the "plotters" could not realize it. In December 1989, a new era of political life started in Czechoslovakia.

National problem and the split of Czechoslovakia

The next three years are crucial for our political developments, and their shadow is visible even today. A new hegemon Civic Forum (OF) quickly arose, dominating the first democratic elections in June 1990. Somewhat surprisingly, the Communist Party got a good result and finished second with about 12% of the vote. The Social Democrats (not fully constituted yet), Greens and Socialist Party were unable to overcome the 5% threshold.

OF was a "catch-all" movement with about 50% electoral support (over 60% in Prague), but soon after the election, differentiation started. About 2/3 turned politically towards the right and created Civic Democratic Party (presided by V. Klaus). In general, the politics in the Czech and Slovak parts of the Federation diverged. The next parliamentary election in June 1992 was decisive for the fate of Czechoslovakia. In the Czech Republic, the winners were right-leaning; the Slovak Republic voted more for the political centre and left. The winners (V. Klaus and V. Mečiar) had enough political strength and finally divided the country (at the end of 1992).

The Communists created an electoral list named Levý blok and displayed a strong reform tendency (the then-Chairman of the Party was movie director, Jiří Svoboda, one of the founding members of OF and a pre-November critical voice inside the KSČ; another leading figure was Ivan Sviták, a well-known non-Communist representative of Prague Spring, who returned from the exile in the USA). They even improved the electoral results compared to 1990, gaining some 14% of the vote. The Party was firmly against the split of the Federation and thus sent a majority of their elite to the Federal Assembly (Parliament).

Establishment of the party Left Bloc

The relatively peaceful political life without strong anticommunist excesses and the good electoral result had one unexpected consequence: many people connected personally with the repressive apparatus or rejecting the political liberalisation lost their fears and increased their political activity.

The most visible sign was the re-admission of Miroslav Štěpán, a pre-November political figure symbolising the normalisation regime, to the CPBM. (He was excluded from the Communist Party in early December 1989 and later sentenced to 4 yrs in jail, on parole since the end of 1991). The democratic Statute of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia did not allow the leadership to prevent it but even made it possible for him and his supporters to create an intra-party Platform (named "For Socialism!"). Party leadership responded by convocating a party Congress for the end of December 1992. The tensions demonstrated themselves with an assassination attempt against J. Svoboda. He was stabbed in front of his house and could just greet the Party Congress with a short audio address from the hospital. The Party Congress adopted changes in the Statute and the Party programme and elected new leadership in a way that effectively stopped the reform efforts of Svoboda and his supporters.

In the first half of 1993, Svoboda and the reform-minded members of CPBM tried in vain to reverse the course. Still, finally they were defeated in the next Party Congress in Prostějov in June 1993.

During the Congress, some of the delegates reacted to the decisions (symbolised by the decision to preserve the word "communistic" in the party name) with a public announcement that they would leave the Party and enter the second partner (DL) in the Left bloc coalition. The leading personality of this group was Josef Mečl. He and other former members of the Federal Assembly later formed the Party of Democratic Left (SDL). The group of members of the Czech parliament tried to balance somehow the forces of both wings at first. Still, soon it became evident that the new party leadership would "clean" even the lower party organs from proponents of the reform course.

The MPs thus decided to register - under the name Left Bloc - a new political party with the possibility of dual membership (allowed by the law at that time). The first Chair of the Left Bloc was Marie Stiborová, who, in January 1993, was a relatively successful opposing candidate for Czech president against V. Havel). If the idea was to maintain the broader collaboration somehow (within the Left bloc coalition or the existing more comprehensive Left bloc initiative), it turned out to be naive, and soon the law was amended (with the help of CPBM MPs), dual membership prohibited, people forced to make a choice. The Left bloc coalition and Left bloc initiative ceased to exist in May 1994.



Chairwoman Marie Stiborová

Electoral defeat and further development

Despite the efforts of some members of both SDL and LB parties, the parties could not find common ground and submitted two independent lists for the parliamentary election in 1996. At that time, a new strong contender came into political life - the Social Democrats (ČSSD), who acquired the charismatic personality of Miloš Zeman in 1993.

On the other hand, SDL and LB could not overcome some personal incompatibilities and programmatic differences (SDL was supported by Ivan Sviták, who in 1968 represented the streams outside the Communist Party, LB by Honorary Chairman Zdeněk Mlynář, one of the key reformers within the Party and a personal friend of M. Gorbachev). In the situation of a fierce political struggle between the finally victorious ODS (30%) and ČSSD (26%), many reform-minded voters decided to support Social Democrats; others opted for a tradition and voted for CPBM (10%).

This defeat changed the situation principally, as neither LB (1,4%) nor SDL (0,13%) were able to get the state contribution and thus could not offer any professional perspective; on the other hand, the ČSSD was on the rise and offered it for some of the former MPs and local politicians.

After some efforts, both parties came together politically under the name LB-SDL (1997) and, finally, the Party of Democratic Socialism (in December of the same year). In January 2020, the Party joined forces with the group Skutečná levice (The genuine Left) and renamed itself the Levice (Left).



Logo of Party of Democratic Socialism

Photo from second congress of Levice party in April of 2023



Rise of the far right in Czechia

Markéta Juřicová



After the Parliamentary elections in Czechia in 2021 a lot of things changed. The major left parties (Communist Party, Social Democratic Party) were under the 5 % limit and for the first time in history left the Parliament. The newly formed Government consists of the neoliberal right wing coalition SPOLU (“TOGETHER”), the Pirate Party and the Mayors Party, both of them being centre-right parties

Only other parties left in the Parliament are ANO, which belongs to the oligarch and ex prime minister Andrej Babiš, and SPD, which is known for populist rhetoric and numerous controversial and often racist statements from its members. Absence of the left in the Parliament now puts the least two parties in the position of the defenders of working people.

After Russian invasion to Ukraine in February 2022, Czech government started pushing towards the 2% GDP limit on defense required by NATO with massive spending on arms and recruiting of new soldiers. Before the elections the government parties made a promise to lower the state budget deficit, which was already huge when they came to power. Obviously, if the government parties are increasing the spending on military and at the same time planning to keep their promises to stabilize the state finances, they have to get the money somewhere. As a result, we are looking at some of the most violent austerity policies in the history of Czech republic.

Together with enormous inflation, which is causing the skyrocketing of energy, housing and food prices, the effects on working people are astronomic. The government has already passed increasing of the retirement age limit, freezing the salaries of thousands of state employees (but they somehow forgot to add parliamentary members to that), and many other harmful policies. As a bitter irony, none of it actually helped with lowering the budget deficit. Instead, it keeps growing to astronomical heights.

With hundreds of thousands of people struggling on the edge of poverty and absolutely incompetent government which fails to help in every possible way, it's no surprise that far right nationalist groups and parties are on the rise. True, the preferences of parliamentary SPD are constantly moving around 9 %, but for a lot of people they are either not radical enough or they would rather vote for ANO, which is not exactly a far right party, but it's moving with the wind and has immeasurably more power. In 2022 we've seen some huge anti-government demonstrations led in the beginning by Ladislav Vrabel, and then by a little more charismatic Jindřich Rajchl, both of them being quite interesting figures operating in the anti-vax and nationalist scene and cooperating with people like Jana Zwyrtková (a senator known for her racist statements and spreading fake news) or Jaroslav Foldyna (ex social democrat, now a member of the parliament for SPD, also known for xenophobic statements).

The speakers at these demonstrations often use left wing rhetoric, but with nationalist twist - at the moment it's mostly anti-ukrainian and anti-immigrant sentiment. Sadly, some of the well known left wing figures are joining these activities, either only for the votes, or they fully converted to the far right ideas over time. Some of the biggest examples is newly formed group Svatopluk, which consists of well known left wing figures such as left wing economist Ilona Švihlíková together with far right nationalists like Michal Semín. This group also uses openly fascist symbols like the three rods in their logo and their ideas are far from what you would expect from the left. Why are far right ideas so attractive for people in Czechia? First of all, there is the historical baggage of the stalinist regime and years of anti-communist propaganda after the Velvet revolution.



Tomio Okamura chairman of far-right Freedom and Democracy party

Working people, of course, know they need an alternative to the neoliberal capitalism, in the 90s and early 2000s the parliamentary left was strong and in the times of Nečas government there was even a widely popular left wing anti-government activist movement. However, the neoliberal right proved to be successful in pulling the anti-communist strings by reminding people of all the wrongs that have been done to them by the previous regime. Support of the left (both parliamentary and activist) is declining and the far right is using the left ideas as their own and the necessity to fight against neoliberal capitalism as the opportunity.

There is also the problem of left ideas being more difficult for people to grasp. The far right always has an easy explanation for everything. You don't earn enough money to survive? It's because of the Roma people. Are there not enough schools for children? It's because of the immigrants. Is there not enough medicine? It's because of third world countries. From someone who appears as a fighter for the working people these explanations seem believable - there is a problem and there is someone who we can point at. It's much easier to blame immigrants and to make their lives even worse than they already were than to fight the rich and overthrow capitalism.

The real danger of the far right co-opting the left wing rhetoric and putting themselves into the role of the protectors of the people is that if this strategy becomes successful, we will have an authoritarian country that (in the best case scenario) pretty much resembles Orbán's Hungary with the conservative approach and severe decline in human rights.


It's crucial for us, especially with the European elections on the way, to stand against all of the far right ideas and activities. Giving up on internationalism and solidarity with the oppressed is the road to destruction of the left. We must hold on our positions and never give them up. Sure, it may be easier to get more votes that way, but it can return badly in the end.



Our social media:



Jsme Levice



@jsme_levice



jsmelevice.cz

Editorial board:

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF: Vítek Prokop

**EDITORS: Adam Ročárek, Roman Janouch, Vojtěch Juřica,
Antonín Hořčica**

TEXT EDITOR: Milan Fujda

GRAPHICS AND DESEIGN: Vítek Prokop

CONTACT: levicoviny@seznam.cz

LEVICOVINY - elektronický zpravodaj Levice. Vydavatel: Levice,
Žirovnická 3133/6, Praha 10 - Záběhlice, 106 00, Česká
republika, IČO 49628089